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ALAN F. HOLMER*
JUDITH HIPPLER BELLOt

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984:
The Road to Enactment
On October 30, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, the most significant trade legislation since 1979. This
article and others in subsequent issues of The InternationalLawyer will focus
on the import relief provisions of this act.' This first article focuses on the
background of the 1984 act, and the most controversial provisions of targeting, natural resource subsidies, and input dumping that were deleted from
the final act.
I.Background

A. 1979

AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTIDUMPING AND

COUNTERVAILING

DUTY

LAWS

Of the various U.S. import relief measures, 2 the most significant and
frequently applied are the antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty
*Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration. The views expressed
are solely those of the authors.
tO'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C. Formerly Deputy (for Policy) to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration.
1. The act also extends for eight and one-half years the Generalized System of Preferences,
under which eligible products from beneficiary developing countries may be imported into the
U.S. free of otherwise applicable customs duties (Title V); authorizes negotiation of a free
trade area with Israel, subject to congressional review (Title IV); establishes some permanent
and some temporary changes in tariff treatment of particular articles (Title I); focuses on trade
in services, making negotiation of agreements concerning high technology products, foreign
direct investment and international trade in services priorities for the Administration (Title
III); and includes provisions aimed at eliminating barriers to international trade in U.S. wine
(Title IX). Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984). For a general overview of the Act, see
Price, The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: An Analytical Overview, 19 INT'L LAW 321 (1985).
2. E.g., §§201,301 and 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251,2411,2436 (1982);
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982); and 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982).
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(CVD) laws. 3 For example, since 1980, well over 500 petitions have been
filed under these laws, alleging that imports have been subsidized or sold at

less than their "fair value," 4 and that they are materially injuring or
threatening to materially injure a U.S. industry.5
3. The CVD law is set forth at § 303 and Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1677g (1982). The AD law is contained exclusively in Title VII, id.
The Department of Commerce is currently the "administering authority" for CVD and AD
proceedings. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 2(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273, 69,274 (1979), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. app. at 1170 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. §§ 131, 135 (1980). In CVD
cases, Commerce identifies and values bounties, grants or subsidies. In AD cases, it determines
whether a product is sold in the U.S. at a price less than its "fair value," which is based upon
sales prices for such or similar merchandise in the home or third country markets or upon a
constructed value derived from the cost of producing the merchandise under investigation.
The International Trade Commission determines whether subsidized or less-than-fair-value
imports cause or threaten material injury to a U.S. industry, or materially retard the establishment of such an industry. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (1982) (but see infra note 5,
describing CVD cases in which the Commission does not make an injury determination).
4. Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
5. As indicated supra note 3, the CVD law is composed of two sections. Congress replaced
earlier CVD provisions with § 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 687, amended
by the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 331, 88 Stat. 1978, 2049-52 (1975); and the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 101-107, 93 Stat. 144, 150 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)). In addition to amending § 303, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 added
Title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101,93
Stat. 144 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1982)).
Before Congress enacted the Trade Act of 1974, § 303 authorized imposition of countervailing duties to offset any bounty or grant bestowed on foreign products imported into the U.S.
that were subject to U.S. duties or tariffs. Tariff Act of 1930, Ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687
(amended 1974, 1979). Section 303, however, did not define the term "bounty or grant," or
require that an injury determination be made before imposing a countervailing duty. Id.
Imposing countervailing duties without an injury determination-without first determining
that the subsidized imports caused or threatened injury to an established U.S. industry, or
materially retarded the establishment of such an industry-conflicts with art. VI, para. 6(a) of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The Protocol of Provisional
Application, through which the United States applies the GATT, however, exempts then
existing legislation from compliance with part II of the GATT, where article VI is found.
Because Congress enacted § 303 prior to 1947, the CVD law found therein does not violate the
GAIT, even though the law does not require an injury test.
The Trade Act of 1974 amended § 303. The Act established the Generalized System of
Preferences, which allows designated imports from certain developing countries to enter the
U.S. free from otherwise applicable tariffs-in other words, duty-free. Trade Act of 1974,
§§ 501-505, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462-2465 (1982). The Trade Act extended § 303 to duty-free
imports, making them subject to countervailing duties if their manufacturers or exporters
received bounties or grants. Trade Act of 1974, § 331, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). Because this
significant change occurred after 1947, however, the GAIT Protocol of Provisional Application did not allow the United States to impose countervailing duties on duty-free imports
without first making the injury determination required by art. VI, para. 6(a) of the GATIT.
Accordingly, the Trade Act of 1974 amended § 303(a)(2) to authorize imposition of countervailing duties on duty-free imports benefitting from bounties or grants only when the International Trade Commission (ITC) found that the imports caused or threatened injury to a U.S.
industry, or prevented establishment of such an industry. Such an injury determination need be
made, however, only when "required by the international obligations of the United States,"
including those undertaken pursuant to the GATT. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982).
The CVD law also was amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. That act approved
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These laws were extensively amended in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979,6 which inter alia implemented into U.S. law the international codes
negotiated during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(MTN). 7 Among these codes were the Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, called the Subsidies Code, 8 and the Agreement on
Interpretation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, called the Antidumping Code. 9 These codes specified in substantially greater detail than previously existed the internationally agreed rules
concerning subsidies and dumping. They were implemented through Title II
the agreements reached in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, including the
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, called the Subsidies Code, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.
Paragraphs 4 and 6 of article 4 of the Subsidies Code prohibit the U.S. and other GATT
signatories from imposing countervailing duties without first making an injury determination.
To implement this and other obligations under the Subsidies Code, the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 added title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930, which applies to countervailing duty
investigations of merchandise from "countries under the [Subsidies Code]." Section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 continues to apply to countervailing duty investigations of merchandise from
countries that are not "countries under the [Subsidies Code]."
Countries under the Subsidies Code are those whose governments have: (1) signed the
Subsidies Code, 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(1) (1982) (currently Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, member states of the European Economic Community, Finland, India, Japan, Korea,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (accepted
in respect of territories for which it has international responsibility, with stated exceptions), the
United States and Uruguay, U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties in Force 296 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg.
52,664 (1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 16,697 (1982); 46 Fed. Reg. 24,059, 46,263, 48,391, 48,807 (1981);
45 Fed. Reg. 1181, 18,547, 36,569, 63,402 (1980)); (2) concluded an agreement with the U.S.
that includes obligations substantially equivalent to those under the Subsidies Code, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671(b)(2) (1982) (currently Taiwan is the only such country, 45 Fed. Reg. 1181 (1980)); or (3)
been determined by the President to meet the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(3) (1982)
through other means (i.e., El Salvador, Honduras, Liberia, Nepal, North Yemen, Paraguay,
and Venezuela; see President's Memorandum of Dec. 14, 1979, Transmitting Determination
Regarding the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,781 (1979); S. REP. No. 249,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 431; H.R. Doc.
No. 153, pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1979)).
The AD law is simpler, in that an injury determination is always required before imposing an
antidumping duty, regardless whether the government of the country from which the merchandise under investigation is imported is a party to the GATT or to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, called the Antidumping Code, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 150 (1979).
7. In addition to those mentioned infra, these codes were: the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402;
Agreement on Government Procurement, T.I.A.S. No. 10,403; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, T.I.A.S. No. 9788; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 31 U.S.T. 405,
T.I.A.S. No. 9616; International Dairy Agreement, 31 U.S.T. 679, T.I.A.S. No. 9623;
Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, T.I.A.S. No. 9701; Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft, 31 U.S.T. 619, T.I.A.S. No. 9620. See H.R. Doc. No. 153, pt. 1,96th Cong., 1st Sess.
413, 663, 675 (1979).
8. 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.
9. 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650.
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of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,10 which prescribed the most radical
changes in the CVD law in its over ninety-year history" and in the AD law in
its over sixty-year history. 12
Despite this detail, the laws remained entirely silent on some fundamental
issues, like how to value subsidies; and sketchy on others, like how to
identify subsidies. Even subjects that were covered in considerable detail

were subject to differing interpretation. Thus, while the accomplishments of
the 1979 Act were substantial, much remained to be decided through

case-by-case implementation of the new provisions.
B.

APPLICATION OF THE

1979

AMENDMENTS

Spurred by the recession and attracted by the absence of political discretion in the AD/CVD laws, 13 U.S. companies filed more and more AD/CVD
petitions. On January 11, 1982, alone, steel companies filed 132 petitions on
various steel products.1 4 These cases were not only numerous, but unprecedentedly complex. For example, they required Commerce to value the
subsidy (if any) conferred through upstream subsidies for coking coal used
to produce steel. Other AD/CVD investigations during 1982 and 1983
required equally complex decisions. For example, some U.S. ammonia,
carbon black and cement producers claimed that cheap natural resources in
15
Mexico were a subsidy for Mexican exports made using those resources.
10. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
11. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, Ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584, amended by the Act of Aug. 27,
1894, Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 521; the Tariff Act of 1897, Ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205; the Tariff
Act of 1909, Ch. 6, § 6, 36 Stat. 11, 85; the Tariff Act of 1913, Ch. 16, § IV(E), 38 Stat. 114,
193-94; the Tariff Act of 1922, Ch. 356, § 318, 42 Stat. 858,946; the Tariff Act of 1930, Ch. 497,
§ 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687. Subsequent amendments of the CVD law are described supra note 5.
12. The AD law dates back to 1921. Antidumping Act of 1921, Ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11, repealed
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 106, 93 Stat. 144, 193 (1979).
13. If Commerce finds subsidies or less-than-fair-value sales and the International Trade
Commission finds injury, threat of injury, or material retardation (where an injury finding is
required), offsetting duties are automatically imposed. Cf. §§ 201-203 of the Trade Act of 1974,
19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982). Under § 202, the President is required to take broad-ranging
factors (such as the effect of import relief on the international economic interests of the United
States) into account in deciding whether and how to grant relief from increasing imports
substantially causing serious injury to a U.S. industry. The President's authority is triggered by
an injury finding and recommendation of relief by the International Trade Commission. By
joint resolution (which requires presidential approval or a two-thirds majority vote of each
house of Congress if he vetoes), the Congress may override any presidential decision differing
from the Commission's recommendation, and thus effect the Commission's recommendations.
Section 248 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984). To the contrary, AD/CVD
determinations are not subject to either presidential or congressional review.
14. See Certain Steel Products from Belgium, etseq., 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304 etseq. (1982) (final
determinations). While there were 216 AD/CVD proceedings in 1982, there were only 25 in
1981 and 30 in 1980. Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Trade, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Trade Remedy Hearings].
15. See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
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Lumber companies in the United States complained that cheap standing
timber in Canada provided a subsidy to Canadian producers of softwood
lumber products.' 6 U.S. nitrocellulose producers complained that the
17
French government targeted its nitrocellulose industry for assistance.
Generally, subsidy allegations
by U.S. companies in CVD petitions became
8
more and more exotic.1
C. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS,

1983-84

1. Spring 1983 Trade Subcommittee Hearings

Decisions by Commerce in increasing and increasingly complex cases
spawned not only extensive litigation,1 9 but also an outcry by U.S. companies unhappy with results in particular cases to their congressional representatives. These complaints contributed to a decision by Sam M. Gibbons
(D.-Fla.), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee,
to call hearings on general reform of the trade remedy laws in March and
April 1983.20
For seven days, the Trade Subcommittee heard testimony from representatives of the Administration and from various industries, such as steel,
textile, glass and tire companies.21 Complaints by these companies about
Commerce's administration of the AD and CVD laws often derived from
particular cases. For example, ammonia, carbon black and cement producers complained that Commerce did not consider cheap natural resources a
subsidy where the low prices were not provided only to a specific industry or
group of industries.2 2 Other U.S. companies compiled a laundry list of more
technical complaints.2 3
2. H.R. 4784-The Trade Remedies Reform Bill

Based upon the spring hearings, in the fall of 1983, Chairman Gibbons
and the House Trade Subcommittee endeavored to draft a bill responsive to
16. See infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
18. See generally Bello and Holmer, The Trade and TariffAct of 1984: PrincipalAntidumping and Countervailing Duties Provisions, in the next issue; and Horlick and Shuman, NonMarket Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping CountervailingDuty Frauds, 18 INT'L LAW. 807
(1984).
19. For example, as of Dec. 6, 1984, 154 AD/CVD cases were pending in the Court of
International Trade or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
20. Trade Remedy Hearings, supra note 14.
21. Id. at, e.g., 92, 162, 610.
22. Id. at 1079, 1111 (statements of Richard R. Rivers, Counsel, Domestic Nitrogen Producers Ad Hoc Committee, Accompanied by Philip H. Potter, Consultant; and L.L. Jacquier,
Executive Vice President, W.R. Grace & Co. on behalf of Domestic Nitrogen Producers' Ad
Hoc Committee), 1194 (statement of Samuel B. Coco, Jr., Senior Vice President, Cabot
Corp.), and 1202 (letter of May 13, 1983, from Ritchie T. Thomas "on behalf of a coalition of
U.S. cement producers and workers" to Sam M. Gibbons).
23. Trade Remedy Hearings,supra note 14, at, e.g., 610 (statement of Terence P. Stewart).
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the concerns of many U.S. industries. The Subcommittee met informally in
conceptual markup sessions 24 to discuss the key provisions of such a bill
(and, on occasion, informally to obtain the views of Administration
representatives). 25

Substantial opposition focused on one particular provision of the draft bill
regarding alleged natural resource subsidies. On October 20, 1983, repre-

sentatives of the Administration and of industries both supporting and
26
opposing this provision testified at a House Trade Subcommittee hearing.

On February 8, 1984, Chairman Gibbons and others introduced H.R.
4784, the Trade Remedies Reform Act of 1984.27 Following lengthy Trade
Subcommittee and full Ways and Means Committee discussion and markup,
H.R. 4784 was passed by the House of Representatives on July 26, 1984, by
a vote of 259 to 95.28
3. H.R. 3398
Meanwhile, the House had also passed a miscellaneous tariffs bill, H.R.

3398,29 considered noncontroversial. On July 31, 1984, the Senate Finance
Committee reported out H.R. 3398 with two amendments sought by the
Administration: extension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),
24. These were referred to as "conceptual" markup sessions, not actual markups, since there
was no draft bill at the time. The sessions addressed major concepts to be included in a bill, in a
markup type procedure.
25. Chairman Gibbons' plan was to use these informal sessions to forge a consensus that
would allow the bill, once introduced, to be reported quickly to the House Ways and Means
Committee and thereafter to the House of Representatives. To expedite drafting and consideration of the bill, he proposed not to hold further hearings, citing the extensive hearings in the
spring.
26. ProposedAmendments to the CountervailingDuty Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Trade, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Hearing on Proposed CVD Amendments].
27. H.R. 4784, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H652 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1984). The
original sponsors of H.R. 4784 were representatives Frenzel, Pease (D.-Ohio), Schulze
(R.-Pa.), Hance (D.-Tex.) and Moore (R.-La.).
28. On March 12, 1984, the Trade Subcommittee reported the bill to the Ways and Means
Committee. Letter of Transmittal from Trade Subcommittee Chairman Sam M. Gibbons to
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (March 12, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Letter of Transmittal], reprinted in HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON H.R. 4784 TRADE REMEDIES REFORM ACT OF 1984 AT

III (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as TRADE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
In the last markup of H.R. 4784 on April 10, 1984, the Committee vote on the bill was 17
yeas, 3 nays. On May 1, 1984, the Committee on Ways and Means reported the bill with
amendments and with dissenting views to the House of Representatives. 130 CONG. REC. H3246
(daily ed. May 1, 1984); H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
On July 26, 1984, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4784. A motion to recommit
offered by Rep. Frenzel (R.-Minn.) was defeated, 128 to 231, and the bill was subsequently
passed by a vote of 259 to 95. 130 CONG. REC. H7904, H7951-53 (daily ed. July 26, 1984).
However, the bill was first amended upon the motion of Trade Subcommittee Chairman
Gibbons, to delete the provision on targeting. Id. at H7944-45.
29. 130 CONG. REC. H4516-24 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
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and authority for free trade area negotiations with Israel .30 From September
17 through 20, the Senate hastily added to H.R. 3398 many other provisions
including import relief measures. 31 Although the AD/CVD provisions did
not entirely mirror those in H.R. 4784, there was a substantial similarity and
overlap between the two bills. While the Senate did not add to H.R. 3398 a

natural resource subsidy provision, it did include an input dumping
provision. 32 On September 20, 33
the Senate passed H.R. 3398 with these and
other import relief provisions.

On October 3, the House reconsidered and passed H.R. 3398, adding the
provisions of H.R. 4784, inter alia.34 Then on October 4 and 5, the House

and Senate conferees 35 met to resolve differences between the two bills. The
conferees agreed on a bill and submitted a conference report on October 5.36
On October 9, the Congress passed
H.R. 3398. 37 On October 30, President
38
Reagan signed the bill into law.

The next article of this series will focus on the import relief provisions of
the Act, principally AD/CVD provisions. 39 The remainder of this article
focuses instead on key provisions absent from the final act: provisions on
targeting, natural resource subsidies, and input dumping.
30. 130 CONG. REC. D997 (daily ed. July 31, 1984); Senate Finance Comm., Press Release
No. 84-15, FinanceCommittee Approves Nomination, Retirement Equity Act, and Trade Bills
(July 31, 1984).
31. 130 CONG. REC. Sl1,229-263 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1984); Sli,355-392 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1984); Sl1,477-507 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984); and S11,554-581 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984).
32. As explained infra note 167 and accompanying text, so-called downstream dumping
(actually upstream dumping or input dumping) refers to the sale at less than fair value of an
input produced in country X (e.g., carbon steel wire rod) to a producer in country Y who uses it
to make a product exported to the U.S. (e.g., barbed wire). Under the current AD law,
Commerce would not investigate any alleged less-than-fair-value sales of an input between
unrelated companies, and would not find any less-than-fair-value sales of the product under
investigation (despite possible less-than-fair-value sales of an input), so long as the product
under investigation is sold at or above its "fair value" (i.e., at or above home or third country
market prices or a constructed value based upon cost of production). The input dumping
provision would have required Commerce to investigate alleged less-than-fair-value sales of an
input accounting for a significant cost of producing the downstream product, and to include any
dumping margins found for the input in margins calculated for the downstream product.
Section 12 of the Trade Law Reform title of H. R. 3398 (130 CONG. REc. S11,367 (daily ed. Sept.
18, 1984)), as passed by the Senate (130 CONG. REC. S11,581 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984)).
33. 130 CONG. REC. S11,581 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984).
34. 130 CONG. REC. H1,079, 11,085 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984).
35. The conferees were: Senators Robert J. Dole (R.-Kan.), Bob Packwood (R.-Ore.),
William V. Roth, Jr. (R.-Del.), John C. Danforth (R.-Mo.), Russell B. Long (D.-La.), Lloyd
Bentsen (D.-Tex.) and Spark M. Matsunaga (D.-Ha.); and Representatives Dan Rostenkowski (D.-Ill.), Sam M. Gibbons (D.-Fla.), Barber B. Conable, Jr. (R.-N.Y.), Bill Frenzel
(R.-Minn.), Thomas J. Downey (D.-N.Y.), Guy Vander Jagt (R.-Mich.), James R. Jones
(D.-Okla.), Ed Jenkins (D.-Ga.), Donald J. Pease (D.-Ohio), Kent Hance (D.-Tex.), and
Bill Archer (R.-La.). 130 CONG. REC. H11,587 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984).
36. H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
37. 130 CONG. REC. Hll,667-668 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984).
38. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
39. Title VI of the 1984 Act.
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II. Targeting
A.

40

BACKGROUND

Recently some foreign governments have increasingly used various practices to target particular industries in those countries for protection and

development. Such targeting practices include special protection of the
home market, restrictions on technology transfer or government procurement, investment restrictions such as domestic content and export performance requirements, and relaxation of normal antitrust rules, when each of

these practices limits competition in a specific sector. 41 They have caused
concern among U.S. exporters, whose products may be excluded from
protected home markets; domestic producers, who compete with targeted

foreign firms; and U.S. government officials, to whom both such domestic
42
interests complain.

B.

THE HOUDAILLE PETITION

Attention to targeting practices escalated in 1982 when Houdaille Industries, Inc. (Houdaille), a Florida-based manufacturer of computer-driven
machine tools, complained that the government of Japan had unfairly
targeted the Japanese machine tool industry. On May 3, 1982, Houdaille
40. See generally Horlick, Bello and Savage, New Developments in Foreign Government
Subsidies: Currentand ProposedResponses Under the U.S. CountervailingDuty and Antitrust
Laws, Antitrust and Trade Policy in Int'l Trade (Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1984).
41. The Department of Commerce has identified 42 separate targeting practices classified
into nine main groups: (1) enhancing export competitiveness; (2) directly supporting research
and development; (3) promoting restructuring of industry; (4) providing capital to industry; (5)
promoting industry through fiscal policy; (6) promoting industry through government procurement; (7) impeding foreign competition in the home market; (8) impeding foreign competition through trade policy; and (9) promoting technology transfer. See outline, "Foreign
Industrial Targeting Project," (undated) (on file with U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Int'l Trade
Administration, Trade Development).
See also U.S. International Trade Commission ("USITC"), Foreign Industrial Targeting and
Its Effects on U.S. Industries, Phase I: Japan 1, USITC Pub. 1437 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
ITC Targeting Study, Phase I] ("Targeting techniques include the selective use of home market
protection, tax policies, antitrust exemptions, science and technology assistance, and financial
assistance"); USITC, Foreign Industrial Targeting and Its Effects on U.S. Industries, Phase II:
The European Community and Member States 1, USITC Pub. 1517 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
ITC Targeting Study, Phase II) (to the same effect)].
42. U.S. targeting practices generate similar complaints from firms in other countries faced
with competition from U.S. exports or whose exports to the U.S. are reduced or excluded by
protection of the U.S. market. E.g., U.S. export licensing requirements under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (formerly
under the Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), as
amended, which expired Sept. 30, 1983); authorization to form export cartels under the Export
Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233-1235 (1982); and encouragement of joint ventures in research and development under the National Cooperative Research
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984).
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filed a petition a under section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971, 44 which
authorizes the President, in his discretion, to suspend the availability of the
investment tax credit for foreign-made goods if he determines, inter alia,
that the country of origin "engages in discriminatory or other acts (including
tolerance of international cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United
States commerce." '45 Houdaille alleged that Japan had done just that,
principally by creating a cartel of producers of numerically controlled
machine tools, but also by giving special tax benefits, making concessionary
loans available, and granting funds for research and development to the
industry.4 6
On April 22, 1983, President Reagan denied the petition.47 Houdaille's
search for relief against alleged targeting practices thus failed.4 8 Yet it
focused attention on the problem of targeting and on the shortcomings of
discretionary trade remedies like section 103. 49
C. SPRING

1983

TRADE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

Targeting was the principal subject of discussion during the Trade Subcommittee's hearings in March and April 1983. Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Lionel H. Olmer characterized the problem
of industrial targeting, and how the
U.S. government should respond to it,
50
as "the problem of this decade."
Just as targeting itself is complex, so is the question of how to deal with it, and
whether or the extent to which our51trade laws are the most appropriate and the
most effective means for doing so.
43. Petition to the President of the United States through the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative for the Exercise of Presidential Discretion Authorized by Section 103 of the
Revenue Act of 1971, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) at 125 [hereinafter cited as Houdaille Petition].
44. 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1982). Houdaille apparently did not believe that it could show
that the Japanese manufacturers of computer-driven machine tools were currently subsidized
to any substantial degree or that the Japanese manufacturers were dumping their products in
the U.S. Thus, a standard countervailing duty or antidumping claim would likely have been
unavailing.
45. Id.
46. Houdaille Petition, supra note 43, at 47-115.
47. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release (Apr. 22, 1983).
48. Shortly before the President's decision, however, it was reported that Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry took steps to raise the price of Japanese machine tools to the
U.S. and Europe, apparently in order to mitigate any injury that the Japanese producers had
been causing. See JapanParriesa ProtectionistThrust, Business Week, April 11, 1983, at 34. To
the extent this is true, the Houdaille petition may have had some practical effect after all.
49. According to Houdaille's attorney, the President's decision was made only after a
"heavy Japanese lobbying effort." Copaken, The Houdaille Petition: A New Weapon Against
Unfair Industry Targeting Practices, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 211, 289 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Copaken]. Mr. Copaken was counsel for Houdaille in this matter.
50. Trade Remedy Hearing, supra note 14, at 40.
51. Id. at 13.
WINTER 1985

296

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Several congressional and industry witnesses offered their definitions of
targeting practices. Motorola Corporation, for example, stated its view that
targeting involves both direct government action and concerted or collective
52
enterprise activities tolerated or encouraged by the government.
Other witnesses offered their views of targeting practices and strategies.
Representative Joseph M. Gaydos (D.-Pa.), Chairman of the Executive
Committee, Congressional Steel Caucus, described his understanding of
how the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry targets
particular industries:
by generous doses of government-directed money, by cartelizing the industry, by
tightening up the home market to suppress the competition, and by demanding
that other major industries
follow a buy-Japan policy, whether their machines
53
would run or not.
Gaydos claimed that the Japanese were now targeting advanced computers,
robotics, aircraft and biotechnology, while they had recently targeted automobiles, steel, and ships.54
Some witnesses, such as Representative John P. Murtha (D.-Pa.), 5
Allan Wolff, counsel for the Semiconductor Industry Association, 56 and
52. Specifically, the Motorola witness mentioned protecting the home market, manipulating
capital markets to favor certain firms, defining what companies shall be in a particular business,
controlling technology transfers, restricting foreign investment, establishing cartels or setting
aside antimonopoly laws, limiting standards, granting concessionary loans, allowing interlocking financial and industrial relationships, sponsoring joint research and development activities,
and discriminatory government procurement. Id. at 46 et seq. (statement of Robert W. Galvin,
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Motorola, Inc.).
Motorola claimed that it had been seriously disadvantaged by Japanese targeting of many of
its electronic products, including the 64K dynamic random access memory and a new cellular
radio telephone system. (Motorola recently filed an AD petition on cellular radio telephones
from Japan. Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies from Japan, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,076
(1984) (initiation).
53. Trade Remedy Hearing, supra note 14, at 287.
54. Id.
55. Representative John P. Murtha (D.-Pa.) described industrial targeting as:
coordinated government policy via an assortment of favorable treatments [that] assists the
growth of a specific home industry through market regulations, bank loan guidance, tariffs
and tax benefits. Among other things, such entities enjoy preferential status with regard to
credit financing, buyer preferences, exemptions from antitrust laws and protection from
foreign competition in the home market.
Id. at 298.
56. Alan Wolff, counsel for the Semiconductor Industry Association, described Japanese
targeting of computers, data processing, robotics, communications and electrical machinery.
Id. at 354. According to Wolff, the Japanese strategy is generally to:
(1) establish an industry in a protected home market, (2) identify a few high volume product
lines in which to specialize, (3) make large investments in advanced production equipment,
(4) launch an "entering wedge" export drive characterized by extremely aggressive pricing to
dominate a particular commodity, and (5) once this beachhead is established, expand the
range of products offered to obtain a commanding position in the market.
Id. at 360.
Specifically with regard to the semiconductor industry, Wolff described how the Japanese
government provided interest-free conditional loans ($132 million from 1976 to 1979), substantial tax benefits, and Japan Development Bank loans at favorable interest rates. Moreover, it
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Allen W. Dawson, Chairmen of a corporation producing fiber optics
products,5 7 offered their definitions of industrial targeting. Other witnesses
complained about targeting without indicating in any detail what practices
targeting encompasses. 58 Every witness discussing the issue at all urged the
Trade Subcommittee to improve remedies available to U.S. firms seeking to
combat targeting practices. As Representative Gaydos stressed generally:
Without laws on the part of the United States that recognize and deal with
[targeting], the targeting will continue, I am afraid, and so will the decline across
the whole spectrum of the economy, from things as basic as steel and the goods
made with it and of it on through things as advanced as the 265K (sic] RAM chip
and the next generation computer.
You see, what some call the sunset industries of today are nothing more than the
bullseye industries of yesterday. They still are targeted. And the sunrise industries
of today, on which some pin so much hope, will be nothing more than the sunset
59
industries of tomorrow if targeted. This is what we face if we do nothing.
Specific proposals to address the problem varied widely. An Administration witness explained the limited applicability of the CVD law to targeting.
First, countervailing duties may only be applied to imports into the United
States, so the CVD law does not reach sales of targeted goods in third
countries in which U.S. exporters and the beneficiaries of foreign targeting
compete. 60 Second, some practices that could be considered "subsidies" in
an economic sense are not considered countervailable under applicable

protected the home market against imports until 1974 through quotas, prior approval, and
restrictions on foreign investments. Id. at 362.
57. Allen W. Dawson, Chairman of Siecor Corporation, a producer of fiber optics, testified
that targeting usually includes the following four elements:
1. Encourage the development of technology through generous government-subsidized
and coordinated research and development;
2. Permit the targeted industry to become established in a protected home market;
3. Encourage the installation of advanced production equipment through low-interest
loans and grants in order to provide a production base with a capacity far in excess of
anticipated home market demand; and
4. Promote sales on world market at world market at whatever price is necessary to utilize
capacity, achieve economies of scale and race foreign competitors down the experience
curve.
Id. at 1226.
58. See, e.g., the statements of Robert B. Peabody, President, American Iron & Steel
Institute (id. at 162, 163-64); the Labor-Industry Coalition for International Trade (id. at 404,
409, 416 etseq.); the Committee to Preserve American Color Television (id. at 151, 157); Jim
H. Conner, Executive Vice President, American Yarn Spinners Association, Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Labor-Industry Trade Coalition (Group of 33) (id. at 249, 250, 257); Terence P.
Stewart, Special Counsel, American Spring Wire Corp., Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co., Florida
Wire & Cable Co., PPG Industries, Inc. (Glass Division), Roses, Inc., SCM Corp. (Consumer
Products Division) and the Timken Co. (id. at 610,615,627); Sen. John Heinz (id. at 344,345);
and Herbert E. Harris (id. at 440, 441).
59. Id. at 289.
60. Id. at 585 (statement of Gary N. Horlick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Import Administration). See also comments by Richard 0. Cunningham, id. at 889. ("[O]ne of
the things that you are not dealing with there is competition in export markets.")
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international agreements. 6' Third, targeting practices encompass activities
that have not traditionally been considered subsidies at all, and that do not
lend themselves to reasonable quantification. 62 Finally, countervailing
targeted imports would lead to retaliation by U.S. trading partners against
U.S. exports:
If it is decided that we should go after all Government-subsidy money, it is fine
with me. I don't think U.S. industry should have to compete with foreign treasuries, but I just return to the golden rule, it is going to be done to us.63
On the other hand, the CVD law has been applied successfully to some
targeting practices, such as government-encouraged joint research and
6
65
development, 64 government-directed allocation of financial credit,
and
66
procurement.
defense
government assistance channeled through
Throughout the hearings, Chairman Gibbons frequently expressed his
view that targeting could effectively be reached, at least in part, under the
CVD law. Although he recognized that targeting would be difficult to
define, 67 he considered it "nothing more than a rather sophisticated backroom type way of subsidizing .... within the spirit of our old [CVD] law. '68
Moreover, he felt its benefits could be identified, 69
measured, and discouraged through imposition of countervailing duties.
D.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

1. Introduction of and Trade Subcommittee Report on H.R. 4784
In conceptual markup sessions begun September 28, 1983, and concluded
February 7, 1984, the Trade Subcommittee considered amending the CVD
law to cover targeting practices. A targeting subsidy would exist whenever a
government plan consisting of coordinated actions helps a specific industry
or industry group to become more competitive in export activities. Illustrative types of actions discussed included the relaxation of normal antitrust
rules, special protection of the home market, special restrictions on technol61. Id. at 573. The applicable agreements are the GATT, supra note 5,and the Subsidies
Code, supra note 5.
62. Trade Remedy Hearings, supra note 14, at 573. See also id. at 889 (remarks of Richard 0.
Cunningham).
63. Id. at 574 (emphasis added) (remarks of Gary N. Horlick).
64. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products from France, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,332 (1982) (final). See also
Horlick, CurrentIssues in CountervailingDuty Law, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979-Four
Years Later 7, 67-70 (1983).
65. Certain Steel Products from France, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,332, 39,333-35 (1982) (final).
66. Industrial Nitrocellulose from France, 48 Fed. Reg. 11,971 (1982) (final). The subsidy
determination was based on the absence of information from the respondent. Id. at 11,972. For
a strong hint that DOC would consider civilian procurement activities countervailable, see Steel
Rails from the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,774 (1982) (initiation). See also
Steel Rails from Luxembourg, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,777 (1982) (initiation).
67. Trade Remedy Hearings, supra note 14, at 40.
68. Id. at 235. See also id. at 292, 387, 889.
69. Id. at 379.
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ogy transfer or government procurement, and the use of investment
restrictions. 70
The targeting proposal provoked both vigorous support and opposition in
the Trade Subcommittee. Chairman Gibbons and Representative Schulze
(R.-Pa.) and Jenkins (D.-Ga.) were its chief advocates, while Representa-

tives Frenzel (R.-Minn.) and Jones (D.-Okla.) opposed it, principally
because of fear that U.S. trading partners would enact mirror legislation

harmful to U.S. exports. Representative Pease (D.-Ohio) proposed to
protect U.S. exports by adding an intent test; targeting practices would be

countervailable only if intended to promote export competitiveness. He
argued that U.S. targeting programs that promoted export competitiveness

lacked such intent. Gibbons and Jenkins opposed the additional test,
arguing that it would be too hard to establish intent. Although Subcommittee members tentatively agreed to include an intent test on February 2,
1984, they reversed their position on February 7. As introduced on February
8 in H.R. 4784,71 the targeting provision lacked an intent test.72
In its report on the bill, 73 the Trade Subcommittee stressed that the
targeting provisions were not aimed at foreign industrial policies per se, a
70. House Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Description of Possible Trade Remedy Bill at 2-3 (undated, but distributed at conceptual
markup session held Sept. 28, 1984).
71. Original section 104 (subsequently section 105) of H.R. 4784 would have amended
section 771(5) of the Tariff Act to add, in the list of defined subsidies (at subpara. (A)(iii)), "any
export targeting subsidy defined in subparagraph (B)." Subparagraph (B) then provided:
(i) IN GENERAL-The term "export targeting subsidy" means any government plan or
scheme consisting of coordinated actions, whether carried out severally or jointly or in
combination with any other subsidy under subparagraph (A), that are bestowed on a specific
enterprise, industry, or group thereof (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as a "beneficiary") of a kind referred to in subparagraph (A)(ii) and the effect of which is to assist the
beneficiary to become more competitive in the export of any class or kind of merchandise.
The actions referred to in the preceding sentence include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(I) The exercise of government control over banks and other financial institutions that
requires the diversion of private capital on preferential terms to specific beneficiaries or
into specific sectors.
(II) Extensive government involvement in promoting or encouraging anticompetitive
behavior among specific beneficiaries; including the providing of assistance in planning and
establishing joint ventures which have an anticompetitive export effect, the relaxation of
antitrust rules normally applied to beneficiaries to assure the development of anticompetitive export cartels, the providing of assistance in planning or coordinating joint research
and development among selected beneficiaries to promote export competitiveness, and
regulating the division of markets or allocation of products among selected beneficiaries.
(III) Special protection of the home market that permits the development of competitive exports in a specific sector or product.
(IV) Special restrictions on technology transfer or government procurement that limit
competition in a specific sector or beneficiary and thereby promote export competitiveness.
72. Dep't of Commerce, Gibbons Trade Remedy Bill at 1-2 (undated).
73. Trade Subcommittee Report, supra note 28, at 18-21.
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matter solely of internal government choice. The provision would apply
only when targeting practices have the effect of increasing export competitiveness of selected industries in a manner injurious to U.S. producers.
The Trade Subcommittee report further stressed that implementation of
the provisions would require a three-step determination by Commerce.
First, Commerce would determine whether there is a government scheme or
plan involving coordinated actions. Second, it would determine whether
targeting practices are involved. In this connection, the Trade Subcommittee stressed that the listing of targeting practices in the bill is "purely
illustrative and not exhaustive since it is not possible to anticipate the full
scope of actions that governments may utilize to achieve the same results." 74
Third, Commerce would determine whether the export targeting subsidy
effectively assists a discrete class of companies or industries to become more
competitive in their export activities. Commerce would not need to find an
intent to assist exportation; rather, it would need to determine whether the
effect of a government plan or scheme was to promote export competitive75
ness.

The Trade Subcommittee report also noted that no countervailing duties
would be imposed unless the Commission found injury by reason of the
subsidized imports. Moreover, the Subcommittee report responded to concerns that enactment of the targeting provisions would lead to mirror
legislation and retaliation against U.S. exports. The report expressed the
view that U.S. practices such as investment tax credits and measures to
promote the formation of export trading companies would not necessarily
constitute targeting as defined in the bill. 76
2. Administration Opposition
While the Administration supported various amendments to the AD and
CVD laws, it vigorously opposed the three main provisions of H.R. 4784 on
targeting, natural resource subsidies, and input dumping. Appendix A to a
letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and United States
Trade Representative William E. Brock to the Committee on Ways and
Means described reasons for the Administration's "strong" opposition to
the targeting proposal.7 7 First, although the Administration agreed that
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id.
76. Id.at 19-21. See also H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-29 (1984), which
similarly describes the targeting provisions of H.R. 4784.
77. Appendix A (at 1-4) to Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and U.S.
Trade Representative William E. Brock to the Honorable Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman,
Committee on Ways and Means (April 3, 1984) (on file at the Dep't of Commerce, Import
Administration, Room 3099-B [hereinafter cited as the Baldrige-Brock letter]. See also Holmer, Special Report: Streamlining Our Laws on Unfairly Traded Imports, 3 INT'L Bus. REV. 3
(July 1984).
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targeting is unfair, it disagreed with the bill's attempt to solve the problem
by amending the CVD law. The Administration said that targeting, as that
term is generally understood, is not a subsidy practice. The Administration
proposed alternatively that targeting be addressed through the GATT, U.S.
diplomacy, and possible use of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.78
Second, the Administration said that the bill's definition of targeting was so
broad as to include legitimate forms of government behavior, and indeed
many programs of the U.S. Government, including its space and agricultural programs and Department of Defense procurement. 79 The Administration opposed treating as unfair such legitimate and widespread practices.
Third, the Administration said that the targeting provisions in the bill would
be impossible to administer and apply. In particular, it would not be possible
to quantify price advantages derived from the conduct described in a fair,
consistent and realistic manner. Fourth, the targeting provisions would
invite the implementation of "mirror legislation" by the United States'
trading partners, and thus lead to possible retaliation against U.S. exports
benefiting from the targeting practices described in the bill. Finally, many of
the targeting amendments were said to be unnecessary, since they covered
practices already prohibited by the CVD law or better addressed through
the GATT.8 °
3. Other Opposition to the Targeting Proposal
The Administration was not alone in opposing the targeting provision.
Other groups soon communicated their negative views to the Ways and
Means Committee as well. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
while supporting a "flexible trade remedy response to clearly identified
cases of injurious foreign export targeting," opposed H.R. 4784's definition
81
of export targeting as a countervailable subsidy.
Likewise, the Business Roundtable opposed the targeting provision as
"not workable from an administrative perspective": 82 attempts to quantify
78. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982), as amended by Title III of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948.
79. See Behr, Inside The Economy: Business Doing Own 'Targeting,' Wash. Post, Sept. 22,
1983, C12, col. 4.
80. Appendix A (at 1-4) to Baldrige-Brock letter, supra note 77.
81. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Position of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the "Trade
Remedies Reform Act of,1983" at 3 (undated) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Chamber Position], and
reprinted in 3 INT'L Bus. REV. 5-6 (May 1984). The Chamber favored alternatively use of
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as "the most appropriate provision of existing law in which
to seek an anti-targeting response." Id. See also Feiner, Special Report: The Trade Remedies
Reform Act of 1984, 3 INT'L Bus. REV. 3, 4-5 (May 1984); and Targeting Provision of Trade
Reform, 3 INT'L Bus. REV. 2 (July 1984).
82. Business Roundtable, The Business Roundtable Positionon the Trade Remedies Reform
Act of 1984 at 2 (March 5, 1984) (on file at its office at 1828 L St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
20036) [hereinafter cited as Business Roundtable Position].
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the benefits of targeting practices would be too uncertain and subjective.
Moreover, its enactment could invite retaliation against the United States.
The Business Roundtable suggested that responding to targeting requires a
more flexible statute than the CVD law. 83
The National Foreign Trade Council feared "significant trade conflicts
with other nations" if the targeting provision were enacted "because targeting is considered by many nations to be an appropriate form of industrial
policy."' 84 The American Association of Exporters and Importers also
opposed the bill in general and its targeting provision in particular. Characterizing the targeting provision as "misconceived and undesirable," the
Association complained of its vagueness and inconsistency with inter85
national obligations, and of the vulnerability of U.S. exports to retaliation.
4. Ways and Means Committee Report

In part in response to such widespread opposition, Representative Conable (R.-N.Y.) offered an amendment to narrow the targeting provision
during the Ways and Means Committee's consideration of H.R. 4784. His
stated purpose was to make it more consistent with and defensible under the
GATT, less confusing, and less likely to trigger mirror legislation harmful to
U.S. exports. His amendment would have removed references to certain
practices such as protection of home markets, assistance to joint ventures,
investment restrictions, and research and development coordination. It
would also have required that the purpose, as well as the effect, of the
competitiveness. 86 The amendment was depractices be to assist export
87
nays.
22
to
yeas
3
feated,
On May 1, 1984, the Committee on Ways and Means reported the bill
with the targeting provision as approved by the Trade Subcommittee. 88 The
report included the dissenting views of Representatives Conable, Archer
(R.-Tex.), Crane (R.-Ill.), Frenzel and Gradison (R.-Ohio), who opposed
the targeting provision, inter alia. They argued that it was inconsistent with
83. Id.
84. National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., Trade Remedy Legislation at 1 (April 17, 1984)
(on file at its office at 100 E. 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10017) [hereinafter cited as National
Foreign Trade Council Statement].
85. American Association of Exporters and Importers, Comments by the American Association of Exporters and Importers on H.R. 4784, The "Trade Remedies Reform Act of 1984" at
3 (May 1984) (on file at the Association's office at 11 W. 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10036)
[hereinafter cited as AAEI Comments].
86. Document entitled "Conable Amendment," distributed at Committee markup in April
1984. See text accompanying note 71 supra, describing Rep. Pease's proposal to add an intent
test.
87. Dep't of Commerce, Information Memorandum, Ways and Means Committee Passage
of H. R. 4787, a bill to Reform the Antidumping (AD) and CountervailingDuty (CVD) Laws at
1 (undated, but describing a Committee markup on April 10, 1984).
88. H.R. REP. No. 725, supra note 76, at 26-29.
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the GAT and the. Subsidies Code, presented a unilateral departure by the
United States from international obligations, assured retaliation against
U.S. exports (either directly through GATI challenges or indirectly
through mirror legislation), and created greater uncertainty in U.S. trade
laws. 89
5. Elimination of the Targeting Proposalfrom H. R. 4784

Significantly, as H.R. 4784 neared floor consideration, the United Auto
Workers and the AFL-CIO opposed the targeting provision, since pending
domestic content legislation and industrial policy proposals-which they
supported-are
targeting practices that H.R. 4784 would have branded as
90
unfair.

Because increasing opposition to the controversial targeting provision
threatened the entire bill, the House Ways and Means Committee on June

26 agreed to delete it during floor consideration of H.R. 4784, and to
authorize instead more studies of foreign targeting practices. 91 On July 26,
H.R. 4784 passed the House as amended.9 2 Section 203 of the bill as passed
required the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the United
States Trade Representative and the Comptroller General each to submit a
comprehensive study on targeting to the Congress by June 1, 1985. 93 As
Trade Subcommittee Chairman Gibbons explained:
89. Id. at 89-91.
90. During House floor debate on H.R. 4784, Rep. Frenzel remarked that: "The section on
targeting ... has now been removed at the request of the AFL-CIO ..
" 130 CONG. REC.
H7906 (daily ed. July 26, 1984). See also 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 7 (July 4, 1984),
91. 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 7 (July 4, 1984); 3 INT'L Bus. REV. 2 (July 1984). The new studies are
in addition to Commerce's general targeting project, see supra note 41; its studies of specific
activities of specific countries (see, e.g., DOC, JapaneseIndustrialPoliciesand the Development
of High Technology IndustrialComputer and Aircraft); and studies by the International Trade
Commission, supra note 41.
92. 130 CONG. REC. H7944-45 (daily ed. July 26, 1984).
93. Section 203 of H.R. 4784 provided:
The Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the United States Trade Representative, and the Comptroller General of the United States shall each undertake, and submit to
the Congress not later than June 1, 1985, a comprehensive study of the problem of foreign
industrial targeting, whereby foreign governments adopt plans or schemes of coordinated
activities to foster and benefit specific industries, and of the desirability or need to amend the
United States trade laws in order to provide effective remedies for domestic industries
against the adverse effects of such targeting. To the extent consistent with agency jurisdiction, such studies shall include, but are not limited to(1) an analysis of(A) whether foreign industrial targeting should be considered as an unfair trade practice
under United States law;
(B) whether current law, including the remedies under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930,
adequately address the subsidy element of foreign industrial policy measures; and
(C) the extent to which foreign industrial targeting practices are significantly affecting
United States commerce; and
(2) any recommended legislation considered necessary based on the study results.
130 CONG. REC. H7945 (daily ed. July 26, 1984).
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The mandated studies will allow for an in-depth analysis of this problem 94
next year
and will enable us to work out a more acceptable legislative solution.

When the Senate passed H.R. 3398 on September 20, it did not include a
provision analogous to section 203 of H.R. 4784. 9 5 The House-passed
version of H.R. 3398 did include such a section, 96 incorporated without
97
change into the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
98
III. Natural Resource Subsidies

A.

BACKGROUND

The genesis of the natural resource subsidy provision was three CVD
cases involving imports from Mexico made using cheap natural resources.
In Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 99 Carbon Black from
Mexico, too and PortlandHydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker from Mex-

ico, 101 some U.S. ammonia, carbon black, and cement producers complained that their Mexican competitors could buy the necessary natural
resources in Mexico at prices far below those available in the United States.
They could thus substantially reduce production costs, since the natural

resources accounted for an unusually high proportion of each product's
value. 10 2 For example, in 1983 Mexican carbon black manufacturers pur94. Id. Chairman Gibbons expressed his regret at the necessity to replace the original
targeting provisions of H.R. 4784 with new section 203's requirements for studies.
Although the committee would have preferred to retain this section, there was substantial
disagreement within the business community, organized labor, and the administration as to
the appropriate way to address foreign industrial targeting.
I want everyone to understand that the committee's decision to delete the targeting
provision should not be interpreted as a retreat from our longstanding effort to address this
very serious problem. The decision to offer this amendment came only after much painstaking effort to work out some acceptable compromise; but in the end it became apparent that
there is still not sufficient consensus within the Government or the private sector on what type
of trade law changes are needed to deal with this very serious problem. So we thought it best
to ask for some detailed Government analysis and recommendations. The Committee on
Ways and Means will also be soliciting, from industry, labor, and other private sector groups,
their views and recommendations, and early next year I intend to begin consideration of
targeting legislation on an expedited basis.
Id.
95. Conference Comparison of H.R. 3398 as passed by the House and the Senate at 108-09
(Oct. 2, 1984).
96. Section 602 of H.R. 3398 as passed by the House, 130 CONG. REC. Hi1,076-77 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1984).
97. Section 625 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2948, 130 CONG. REC. H11,559
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984).
98. See generally Bello and Holmer, Subsidies and Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a
Lateral Attack on the Specificity Test, 18 G.W.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 501 (1984).
99. 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (1983) (final) [hereinafter cited as Ammonia from Mexico].
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1983) (final).
101. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063 (final) [hereinafter cited as Cement from Mexico].
102. Natural gas accounts for about 80 percent of the cost of producing ammonia (Petition of
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chased petroleum feedstock in Mexico for $2.00 per barrel. 10 3 U.S. carbon
black manufacturers purchased feedstock at the world price of $26.00 per
barrel.1°4 The difference-$24.00 per barrel-gave Mexican carbon black
producers a significant advantage over their U.S. competitors.
In Ammonia from Mexico, 10 5 petitioners specifically complained that
Mexico's state-owned oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), monopolizes both natural gas and ammonia production; and that as an ammonia producer, it "purchases" natural gas at prices far cheaper than the
06
prices in the U.S. for Mexican natural gas or domestic natural gas.'
Petitioners argued that the difference between either of the latter prices and
the lesser Mexican domestic price was
a subsidy to Mexican natural gas
07
users, including ammonia producers. 1
Commerce found to the contrary that the alleged "commercially unreasonable price" for natural gas in Mexico did not confer a countervailable
domestic subsidy. Unlike export subsidies, 10 8 domestic subsidies are countervailable only "if provided or required by government action to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries."' 1 9 Because of

W.L. Grace & Co., First Mississippi Corp., Mississippi Chemical Corp., and Olin Corp., vol. 1
(Oct. 28, 1982), Central Records Unit, Room B-099, Department of Commerce); petroleum
feedstock accounts for about 70 percent of the cost of producing carbon black (Hearing on
Proposed CVD Amendments, supra note 26, at 8 (statement of Representative Alan B.
Mollohan)); and heavy fuel oil accounts for nearly 50 percent of the cost of manufacturing
cement, id. at 3 (statement of Senator Peter V. Domenici); Cement from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg.
31,437, 31,439 (1983).
103. Hearingon ProposedCVD Amendments, supra note 26, at 8 (statement of Representative Alan B. Mollohan).
104. Commerce issued an affirmative preliminary determination on October 1,1984. Carbon Steel Plate from the Federal Republic of Germany; Preliminary Determination of Sales at
Less Than Fair Value, 49 Fed. Reg. 39,591 (1984). On Nov. 30, 1984 (retroactively effective on
Nov. 16, 1984), it terminated that investigation after petitioner withdrew its petition. Carbon
Steel Plate from the FRG; Termination of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 49 Fed. Reg.
48,082 (1984).
105. 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (1983) (final).
106. Id. at 28,524.
107. Id.
108. Export subsidies are defined illustratively by reference to the Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies annexed to the Subsidies Code, supra note 5. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982).
109. Commerce considers programs limited to a specific region or regions of a country as
limited to a specific group of enterprises or industries. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products from
Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,305 (1982) (final).
In Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)
(Maletz, J.), the Court of International Trade upheld Commerce's application of the specificity
test. But cf.Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 84-67, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade June 8,
1984) (Watson, J.), in which extensive dicta rejected the proposition "that, as a general rule,
generally available benefits are not subsidies." Id. at 5.
Because Mexico has not signed the Subsidies Code, has not concluded an agreement
including substantially equivalent obligations, or been determined to meet the requirements of
19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(3), it is not a "country under the [Subsidies Code]" as defined in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671(b) (1982). See supra note 5 (discussing "countries under the [Subsidies Code]").
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this requirement, called the specificity test, any benefit (other than an export
subsidy) that is made more widely available is not countervailable under the
U.S. CVD law. In Ammonia from Mexico, Commerce found that natural

gas was not provided at a preferential rate to a specific industry or group of
industries including ammonia producers. 110 In fact, Commerce verified that
as an ammonia producer, PEMEX paid more for gas than other industrial
users. 11

In Carbon Black from Mexico," 2 Commerce concluded similarly that the
price differential between export and domestic sales of Mexican petroleum
feedstock was not a countervailable domestic subsidy, because it did not
benefit only a "specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or

industries." Rather, all Mexican industrial users could obtain113 petroleum
feedstock at the same price paid by carbon black producers.
Likewise in Cement from Mexico, 114 Commerce determined that the price
differential between inexpensive domestic sales and the more expensive
export sales of heavy fuel oil used to produce cement did not benefit a
specific industry or group of industries in Mexico, because all domestic
industrial users of heavy fuel oil could obtain it at the price paid by cement
producers. 115 Thus in all three Mexican cases, Commerce found no subsidy
conferred by cheap natural resources, based in each case upon the specificity
test.
A fourth significant natural resource case in 1983 was Certain Softwood
Productsfrom Canada.116 The petitioner alleged that the Canadian federal

and provincial governments subsidized softwood products by selling standCountervailing duty investigations of merchandise from Mexico therefore are conducted under
§ 303.
As authorized by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Department of Commerce applies
Title VII criteria for export and domestic subsidies, including the specificity test, in § 303
investigations in deciding whether programs confer a "bounty or grant." 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)
(1982). See also Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 839 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983) ("In enacting the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 Congress specifically provided
that the new statutory term 'subsidy' has the same meaning as the term 'bounty or grant' found
in section 303.").
110. 48 Fed. Reg. at 28,524.
111. Id. Petitioners also alleged that industrial users of natural gas paid a lower price for it
than other users. Commerce determined that although the standard industrial price was less
than the price for residential users in Mexico, the standard price did not benefit a specific
industry or group of industries. Id. Nor did Commerce consider the industrial-residential price
differential an export subsidy. Availability of the lesser price was not contingent upon export
performance, and Commerce had no reason to believe that the price operated to stimulate
export over domestic sales. Id. In support of its conclusion, Commerce noted that different rate
structures for residential and industrial users are common in the United States. Id.
112. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1983) (final).
113. Id. at 29,566.
114. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063 (1983) (final).
115. Id.at 43,066.
116. Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983) (final).
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ing timber (stumpage) at prices well below those charged in the United
States. 1 17 Commerce found no subsidy conferred by the stumpage
programs. 1 8 It alternatively decided that even if Canada's stumpage programs conferred benefits, they were not countervailable because they were
not provided only to a specific industry or group of industries. Stumpage was
available to anyone on equal terms and was in fact used by diverse industries
making numerous products. 119 Use of stumpage was limited not by any
characteristics of this natural
governmental action, but only by the inherent
120
resource and the production technology.
B.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

1. Spring 1983 Trade Subcommittee Hearings
When the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee held trade remedy hearings in March and April 1983, Commerce had just issued preliminary (but not final) determinations in the softwood lumber product cases, 12 '
and decided preliminarily the Mexican natural resource cases 1 22 during the
course of the hearings. Not surprisingly, some of the U.S. companies
concerned were represented during the hearings. Ammonia, carbon black
and cement producers each complained about Commerce's negative preliminary determinations concerning natural resources sold domestically at
low but generally available prices. 123
2. October 1983 Trade Subcommittee Hearing
In discussing possible provisions of a trade reform bill the following fall,
the Trade Subcommittee considered a natural resource subsidy provision
that would eliminate the specificity test in such cases and thus effectively
overrule Commerce's Mexican natural resource decisions. This provision
scheduled a sepaproved so controversial that Chairman Sam M. Gibbons
12 4
rate hearing on October 20, 1983, to discuss it alone.
117. Id. at 24,160.
118. Id. at 24,167-68. Commerce found the stumpage programs did not confer an export
subsidy because the government did not make them contingent upon export performance, or
intend them to stimulate export over domestic sales. Id. Commerce also found that no domestic
subsidy existed for several reasons.
119. Id. at 24,167.
120. Id. Commerce declared that while nominal general availability of a domestic program
does not necessarily suffice to avoid CVD liability, in fact stumpage is used within Canada by
several groups of industries.
121. Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,395 (1983) (preliminary).
122. Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,729 (1983) (preliminary); Carbon Black from
Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,304 (1983) (preliminary); and Cement from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg.
31,437 (1983) (preliminary).
123. Supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
124. Hearingon ProposedCVD Amendments, supra note 26, at 1 (press release, Subcomm.
on Trade).
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The natural resource proposal discussed would have expanded the definition of a countervailable domestic subsidy to include a natural resource sold
domestically, subject to government control, at a price less than (1) its
export price, (2) its "fair market value," or (3) the price generally available
to U.S. producers, if the resource accounted for a significant portion of the
cost of producing the merchandise under investigation.' 25 The measure
would have made cheap energy resources countervailable in CVD
h low
o price in the foreign country were widely
investigations, 126 even iif the
available to diverse users within the domestic economy. Representative
Gillis W. Long articulated the rationale in a statement given to the Trade
Subcommittee:
When a foreign government supplies a key production input at preferential prices
to more than one of its domestic industries, it is subsidizing each of these industries. A subsidy does not cease to be a subsidy because it is produced to more than
one beneficiary-particularly when in each case the subsidy dramatically reduces
production costs.'27
The Administration opposed the natural resource subsidy proposal at the
October 20 hearing for five reasons. First, generally available domestic
subsidies should not be countervailable because they do not distort the
allocation of resources within a country. Second, absent such distortion,
foreign governments would perceive as unfair the United States' sitting in
judgment on the fairness of others' purely internal policies and practices.
Third, other countries would likely retaliate against U.S. exports made
using price-regulated natural gas (such as textiles and petrochemicals).
Fourth, it would be unfair to preclude countries with abundant natural
resources from capitalizing on their comparative advantages. Fifth, the
proposal would depart significantly from the international consensus on
28
what constitutes a subsidy.1
Some U.S. companies also opposed the natural resource subsidy proposal, for many of the same reasons, but principally because of the threat of
29
retaliation against U.S. exports.'

125. Id.
126. TRADE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, see supra note 28, at 22.
127. Hearing on Proposed CVD Amendments, supra note 26, at 5.
128. Id. at 23-39 (statement of Alan F. Holmer and testimony of Claud L. Gingrich).
129. Hearing on Proposed CVD Amendments, supra note 26, at 112 (statement of Robbin
Johnson, Vice President for Public Affairs, Cargill, Inc. and testimony of John B. Rehm,
former General Counsel to the Special Trade Representative).
See also Letter from Richard 0. Cunningham to Sam. M. Gibbons, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Trade, House Comm. on Ways and Means (October 12, 1983) (on file with the Trade
Subcomm. Staff). Mr. Cunningham's letter states: "I view this provision as special-interest
legislation, aimed at protecting the interests of a small group of domestic ammonia producers.
The provision is inconsistent with the principles of U.S. trade policy." Id.
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3. Introduction and House Passageof H.R. 4784
At its final conceptual markup sessions on February 2 and 7, 1984, the

Trade Subcommittee voted to include the natural resource subsidy provision. Representative Frenzel alone dissented, based on his contention that it
130
attacked comparative advantage rather than an unfair trade practice.
Thus, despite Administration opposition, the Trade Remedies Reform bill,
introduced on February 8, 1984, provided that a natural resource subsidy
would exist whenever:
(1) a foreign government-regulated or controlled entity sells natural resource
products domestically at prices lower than either the export price or the "fair
market value"; and
(2) the domestic price is not available for exports to the United States; and
(3) the natural resource product constitutes a significant
31 portion of the production
costs of the export under the CVD investigation.'
The amount of such a subsidy would be the difference between the resource's domestic price and export price, or between its domestic price and
"fair market value" if there were no exports or the export price were
distorted by government manipulation. If enacted, this provision would
have nullified the specificity test in CVD investigations of many energy-

intensive imports, and made foreign pricing practices
for energy resources
32

countervailable even where broadly applied.1
On March 12, 1984, the Trade Subcommittee reported H.R. 4784 to the
Ways and Means Committee. 133 The Report outlined the Subcommittee's
disagreement with recent Commerce decisions involving the sale of a natural resource.' 34 Where a government-controlled natural resource accounts
for a significant portion of the value of a product, the Subcommittee felt that
its domestic sale at prices below export prices should constitute a countervailable domestic subsidy, irrespective of the number of industries able to
35
purchase the inexpensive natural resource.'

130. Dep't of Commerce, Gibbons Trade Remedy Bill, supra note 72, at 2.
131. Section 104(a)(1) of H.R. 4784, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H652 (daily ed.
Feb. 8, 1984). "Fair market value" is "the price that would normally apply in an arms length
transaction absent government regulation or control." H.R. REP. No. 725, supra note 76, at 30.
132. For a discussion of the specificity test, see generally Bello and Holmer, Subsidies and
Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a Lateral Attack on the Specificity Test, supra note 98.
133. Letter of Transmittal, supra note 28, at III-IV.
134. TRADE SUBcOMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 22. Although the report did not
mention any particular cases, the reference almost assuredly was to Ammonia from Mexico, 48
Fed. Reg. 28,522 (1983) (final), Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1983) (final),
and Cement from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,029 (1983) (final).
135. TRADE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 22. The Report stated:
The Subcommittee is aware of recent decisions by the Department of Commerce to the effect
that pricing policies of this sort did not constitute subsidies because in those cases such prices
were generally available to all domestic producers. However, the Subcommittee believes
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The Administration continued to oppose the natural resource subsidy
provision. On April 3, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and U.S.
Trade Representative William E. Brock wrote Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Dan Rostenkowski and other Congressmen opposing the natural
resource subsidy provision. Appendix A to that letter states their reasons.
First, the provision would represent a major departure from longstanding
U.S. and international practice regarding the definition of a subsidy. Such a
drastic and unilateral departure from the international consensus on what
constitutes a subsidy would expose U.S. exports to a serious risk of retaliation. Even if the U.S. persuaded other GATT and Subsidies Code parties
that the provision was consistent with those agreements, U.S. exports made
using price-regulated natural gas would be exposed to countervailing duties
elsewhere. Baldrige and Brock also noted U.S. investment in foreign countries with abundant hydrocarbon natural resources, whose export to the
U.S. would be jeopardized by the natural resource subsidy provision. They
reiterated the concern expressed at the October 20 hearing that the provision would unfairly prevent developing countries with abundant natural
resources from capitalizing on their comparative advantages. Finally, they
opined that it was an unwarranted intrusion into the sovereign affairs of
foreign nations. 136
Opposition to the natural resource subsidy provision mounted from
powerful business interests and foreign governments as well, including the
Chamber of Commerce, 137 Business Roundtable, 13 8 American Association
of Exporters and Importers,' 39 the Coalition to Promote America's Trade
(including Mobil Chemical Company, Occidental Chemical Corporation
and Union Carbide Corporation), 4 0 a "substantial number" of members of
42
141
the National Foreign Trade Council, and the Government of Canada. 1
On May 1, 1984, the Committee on Ways and Means reported the bill
that resource pricing policies of the type described in this provision should constitute
prohibited subsidies even where nominally available to all industrial users, at least in cases
where the resource in question comprises a significant portion of the final product.
Id.
136. Appendix A (at 5-7) to Baldrige-Brock letter, supra note 77. Secretary Baldrige and
Ambassador Brock also sent subsequent letters to other members of Congress. See 130 CONG.
REC. H7908 (daily ed. July 26, 1984).
137. U.S. Chamber Position, supra note 81, at 5.
138. Business Roundtable Position, supra note 82, at 4.
139. AAEI Comments, supra note 85, at 4.

140. Statement of May 18, 1984 (on file at the Coalition's office at 1875 Eye St. N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036). The Coalition was formed expressly to oppose the natural resource
subsidy provision.
141. National Foreign Trade Council Statement, supra note 84, at 2.
142. Letter of Allan E. Gotlieb, Ambassador of Canada, to Chairman Rostenkowski (on file
with the staff of the Subcomm. on Trade, House Ways and Means Comm.) [hereinafter cited as
Gotlieb letter]. See also Samuelson, Changing the Politics of Trade Protection, Wash. Post,
Sept. 12, 1984, at D8, col. 1.
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with amendments. 143 The Committee's Report includes the dissenting views
on the natural resource subsidy provision of Representatives Conable,
144 They made the same arguments as
Archer, Crane, Frenzel and Gradison.
145
advocated by the Administration.
On July 26, the House considered H.R. 4784. Representative Frenzel
offered a motion to recommit the bill, 1 46 based in part upon his and other
members' opposition to the natural resource subsidy provision. For example, Representative Frenzel urged that the natural resource subsidy provision would violate U.S. international trade agreements, threaten benefits
enjoyed by the United States from an open international trading system,
jeopardize U.S. exports, harm the important role of the United States
as a leader in the GATF, and repudiate the principle of comparative
advantage. 147 Other Congressmen also spoke in opposition to the natural
resource subsidy provision, including Representatives Crane, 148 Roberts

(R.-Kan.)

,149

Bereuter (R.-Neb.), 150 McGrath (R.-N.Y.),' 5' and Daschle

152

However, Representative Frenzel's motion to recommit was
(D.-S.D.).
defeated. 1-3
4. House-Senate Conference
The subject of a natural resource subsidy provision was not raised during
Senate floor consideration of H.R. 3398, despite Senator Russell Long's
strong support for it. 154 Presumably he and any other supporters feared that,
if offered as an amendment, it would have been rejected. Express Senate
rejection of the provision would have seriously hindered Senate conferees'
negotiating ability regarding it during the imminent House-Senate conference.
In any event, H.R. 3398 as passed by the Senate did not include a natural
resource subsidy provision. 155 Thus when Senate and House conferees met
143. 130 CONG. REC. H3246 (daily ed. May 1, 1984).
144. H.R. REP. No. 725, supra note 76, at 91-92.
145. Id.
146. 130 CONG. REC. H7947 (daily ed. July 26, 1984).
147. Id. at H7905-08, H7911-12. S. 2952, a trade remedy bill introduced by Sen. Heinz
(R.-Pa.) on Aug. 10, 1984, did not include a natural resource subsidy provision. 130 Cong. Rec.
S10,562 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984). Section 10 of that bill would have amended the Act to cover a
domestic subsidy "explicitly or effectively provided to a specific enterprise or industry or group
(emphasis added).
of enterprises or industries.
148. Id. at H7912-13.
149. Id.at H7930-31.
150. Id. at H7932-34, H7945-46.
151. Id. at H7935-36.
152. Id. at H7937-38.
153. See supra note 28.
154. See text accompanying note 157 infra.
155. See Senate Passes Wide-Ranging Trade Measure, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1984, at D10,
col. 5, expressing Senate Republicans' expectations prior to Senate passage of H.R. 3398 that it
would get "tied up in long debates" over amendments on natural resource subsidies, inter alia.
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October 4 and 5 to resolve their differences on H.R. 3398, one issue was the
natural resource subsidy provision.1 56 In fact, it was one of the last and most
controversial issues to be resolved. Despite its absence from the Senatepassed bill, Senator Russell Long staunchly advocated the provision despite
Administration and widespread industry opposition. 157 In response to such
opposition, he offered to limit its application to countries that were neither
GATT members nor certain state-controlled economy countries. 158 In
effect, he proposed to craft a natural resource subsidy provision aimed at
Mexico (although it would probably have applied to Saudi Arabia as well).
Senator Long even offered to provide an injury test in these natural resource
cases, despite the absence
of this test in any other CVD investigation of
59
products from Mexico.'
Unable to resolve this and other key issues in public session, the conferees
adjourned on the evening of October 4 to meet privately. The Senate
conferees met separately with Administration representatives, 160 and heard
again the reasons for Administration opposition to the natural resource
proposal, even if limited in application. Ambassador Brock made it clear
that this was an issue on which the Administration had drawn a line in the
sand; a bill containing a natural resource subsidy provision would almost
62
certainly have been vetoed by the President. 161 The Republican Senators 163
colleagues
Democratic
their
outvoted
and
opposition,
their
maintained
4 to 3.164 When the conference convened again October 5, the House
156. Conference Comparison of H.R. 3398 as passed by the House and the Senate at 116-17
(Oct. 2, 1984).
157. Administration opposition is described supra at notes 128, 136 and accompanying text;
other opposition is described supra notes 129, 137-42 and accompanying text. See also The
Anti-Trade Bill (cont'd.), Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1984, at D6, col. 1.
158. Transcripts of these conference sessions are maintained by the Committee on Ways and
Means but are not available to the general public.
Regarding state-controlled economy countries, Sen. Long referred specifically to those
subject to § 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982).
159. See supra notes 5 and 109 regarding Mexico's current ineligibility for an injury test in
CVD proceedings.
160. U.S. Trade Representative William E. Brock, USTR General Counsel Claud L.
Gingrich, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration Alan F.
Holmer.
161. See Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige's statement to this effect. Auerbach,
Baldrige Says President May Veto Trade Measure, Wash. Post Oct. 2, 1984, at Dl, col. 3.
162. Robert J. Dole (R.-Kan.), Bob Packwood (R.-Ore.), William V. Roth, Jr. (R.-Del.),
and John C. Danforth (R.-Mo.).
163. Russell B. Long (D.-La.), Lloyd Bentsen (R.-Tex.), and Spark M. Matsunaga (D.Hawaii).
164. Sen. Long remarked:
[The natural resource subsidy] provision was endorsed by a 26 to 2 vote in the Ways and
Means Committee, but due to the opposition of the Senate Republican conferees it was
deleted from the bill in Conference.
130 CONG. REC. H1,666 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984).
165. Barber B. Conable, Jr. (R.-N.Y.), Bill Frenzel (R.-Minn.), and Bill Archer (R.Tex.).
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conferees-including three members who had previously dissented on the
natural resource subsidy provision in H.R. 4784 16 5-agreed to recede to the
Senate on this issue, and the Senate conferees voted to delete the provision.
While the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 is consequently silent on the
subject, continuing concern by some U.S.
companies and members of
166
Congress may lead to its reconsideration.
IV. Input Dumping
A.

BACKGROUND

The genesis of the input dumping provision (misnamed downstream
dumping 167 in both House and Senate bills) was less specific than for the
targeting and natural resource subsidy provisions, but no less real. U.S.
industries faced a legitimate commercial problem: Goods were dumped
from one country to another, where they were then reprocessed into a
finished product and exported to the United States. Consider the following
example. A steel wire rod producer in Country X dumps its wire rod in
Country Y. A barbed wire producer in Country Y converts the dumped wire
rod into barbed wire and sells it to the United States. A U.S. barbed wire
producer brings an antidumping case against the barbed wire from Country
Y, alleging that the producer in Country Y has benefitted from "upstream
dumping" from Country X. For a variety of reasons discussed below, U.S.
antidumping law does not include "upstream dumping" in calculating
dumping margins.
B.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

1. Spring 1983 Trade Subcommittee Hearings
Realizing the problem posed by dumped foreign basic steel mill products
increasingly shut out of the U.S. market, producers of more finished steel
products expressed their concern about input dumping during the Trade
166. During Senate debate, Sen. Danforth remarked to Sen. Long that "it is the intention of
the Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee to look at this question [on natural
resource subsidies] very seriously." 130 CONG. REC. S11,565 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984).
Advocates of the provision stated their refusal to abandon the issue. (E.g., "I will continue to
raise this issue until we adopt a strategy to meet this threat." 130 CONG. REC. H11,666 (daily ed.

Oct. 9, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Long, D.-La.).)
See also Administration May Seek Cumulation Provision Elimination, New FootwearInvestigation Seen, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 473 (Oct. 17, 1984), reporting that the major provisions
dropped from the bill, including natural resource subsidies, "are expected to be raised again in
the next Congress even though there does not appear to be strong support for passage of these
provisions at this time."
167. Downstream dumping is more appropriately called "upstream" or "input" dumping,
inasmuch as the dumping that the provision attempts to reach is "upstream" in the production
chain from the exported product.
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Subcommittee hearings in March and April 1983. For example, representatives of the stainless steel wire industry sought an amendmentwhich would allow antidumping and countervailing duty cases to be brought
directly against dumped and subsidized downstream products. We are seeing
finished products made from stainless steel wire such as fasteners, wire mesh, and
wire rope entering the United States at prices which are below the cost of
producing the wire alone, the raw material itself.
Such practices are undermining the U.S. stainless steel wire producers as well as
our customers, the producers of the finished product. Yet under our current laws
our hands are tied and we are unable to pursue a remedy directly in unfair trade
practices. We recommend an effective amendment to the antidumping and countervailing duty laws that would grant standing to producers of the components of
raw materials or end-use products as well as producers of the end-use products
themselves. 168
The Metalworking Fair Trade Coalition likewise complained about input
dumping. Its spokesman explained:
Experience in the past has shown that when overseas steel suppliers find their U.S.
market has been cut off or reduced they sell their steel to metalworkers in their
own country at prices lower than those at which they sell the same steel for their
domestic competition with the proviso that the products made therefrom must be
exported. The metalworkers in turn are then able to sell those products in our
markets at unrealistically low prices-prices frequently lower than the cost of the
equivalent steel. That's downstream dumping-and
all of us, including your steel
69
industry constituents, are being dumped on.'
1 70
The Committee on Pipe and Tube Imports expressed similar concern.
2. Introduction and House Passage of H.R. 4784
During conceptual markup sessions in the fall of 1983,171 the Administration opposed the input dumping proposal then being discussed by Trade
Subcommittee members. One reason for this opposition was its inconsistency with the GATT and Antidumping Code. Under these agreements, the
U.S. is authorized to impose offsetting antidumping duties only when it has
found both sales at less than fair value and resulting injury to a U.S. industry
caused by a "like product., 172 Quite simply, an input into a more finished
product in most circumstances is not "like" the finished product. Therefore,
imposing additional duties on products because of an unfairly priced input is
inconsistent with U.S. GATT and Code obligations.
168. Trade Remedy Hearings, supra note 14, at 222-23, 227 (statement of William J.
Pendleton, Chairman, Stainless Steel Wire Industries of the United States, accompanied by
David A. Hartquist, counsel).
169. Trade Remedy Hearings,supra note 14, at 313 (statement of Art Davidson on behalf of
the Metalworking Fair Trade Coalition); see also id. at 527 (statement of Robert J. Blinken,
Chairman, Mite Corporation, on behalf of the Metalworking Fair Trade Coalition).
170. Trade Remedy Hearings,supra note 14, at 1199 (statement of Mark Roy Sandstrom,
Esq., counsel on behalf of Committee on Pipe and Tube Imports).
171. See supra note 24.

172. GATT Art. VI, Antidumping Code Art. 2.
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Second, the Administration spokesmen expressed concern during the
conceptual markup sessions whether the provision could be effectively or

fairly administered. In order to complete the investigation, Commerce
would have to obtain the home market prices and cost of production from
the producer of the upstream product. The upstream producer would have
virtually no incentive to cooperate in Commerce's investigation. Enactment
of an input dumping provision would thus often mean that Commerce would
be compelled to use "best information available., 1 73 Use of such information, which can exaggerate possible dumping margins, is unfair to the

producers under investigation, who in all likelihood lack sufficient leverage
over their suppliers to assure cooperation.
Third, administrators of the AD law expressed the view that additional
limits for
investigations of input dumping within the already tight time
174
investigating the finished product ordinarily are not feasible.
Nonetheless, the bill introduced on February 8, 1984, included an input

dumping provision.1 75 That provision would apply only when the input had a
173. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1982).
174. The time limits for preliminary and final decisions by Commerce in antidumping cases
are statutorily prescribed. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(b), 1673d(a) (1982).
175. Section 104 of H.R. 4784 included the following provision on input dumping:
(b) DOWNSTREAM DUMPING.(1) DEFINITION.Downstream dumping occurs when(A) a product that is used in the manufacture or production of merchandise subject to
investigation under subtitle A or B is purchased at a price that is below its foreign market
value (as determined under subtitle B without regard to this subsection),
(B) that purchase price(i) is lower than the generally available price of the product in the country of
manufacture or production, or
(ii) if the generally available price of the product in the country of manufacture or
production is artificially depressed by reason of any subsidy or other sales at below foreign
market value, is lower than the price at which the product would be generally available in
such country but for such depression, and
(C) the difference between the foreign market value and such purchase price has a
significant effect on the cost of manufacturing or producing the merchandise under investigation.
(2) INCLUSION OF AMOUNT ATTRIBUTABLE TO DOWNSTREAM DUMPINGIf the administering authority decides, during the course of an investigation under
subtitle A or B, that downstream dumping is occurring, or has occurred, with respect to
any product used in the manufacture or production of the merchandise under investigation, the administering authority, in calculating the amount of any countervailing duty
or antidumping duty on such merchandise, shall include an amount equal to the difference between the foreign market value of such product and either
(1) the generally available price, referred to in paragraph (1)(B)(i), of the product; or
(2) the price, referred to in paragraph (1)(B)(ii), of the product that would pertain
but for artificial depression, whichever price is appropriate.
(c) SCOPE OF INQUIRY BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY.-The administering
authority is not required, in undertaking an investigation under subtitle A or B, to inquire
regarding the presence of an upstream subsidy, or of downstream dumping, beyond that state
in the manufacture or production of the class or kind of merchandise that immediately
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significant effect on the product's final cost. Moreover, the provision applied
only where the input is sold from one country into another, i.e., not when it
is simply sold within the same country in which the product under investigation is produced or exported. Moreover, the provision prescribed the use of
a "generally available price," as adjusted for any artificial price depression
caused by dumping or subsidization, with which to compare the price
actually charged for the input. 176 The reason for this comparison was that if
the price charged for the input is no less than the "generally available" price
for the input, presumably there is no benefit received by the input purchaser.
In its report, the Subcommittee noted its concern that while current law
does not address the problems of input dumping, that practice is becoming
"a significant irritant to U.S. businesses."1 77 The report also responded to
concerns expressed earlier by the Administration. It noted that:
In particular, it will be difficult to secure cooperation from the country that is
dumping the prior-stage product in order to determine foreign market value, since
producers in that country have no reason to cooperate with our authority. Also,
determinations as to the generally available price in the country of export to the
United States-as well as the level
178 of artificial price depression-will be difficult to
establish with much precision.
However, the Subcommittee noted its belief that these difficulties could
be resolved by allowing Commerce "broad discretion to use the best available information" and by having the courts give its calculations "great
latitude. ,,179
The Administration continued "strongly" to oppose the input dumping
provision. 180 Appendix A to Secretary Baldrige's and Ambassador Brock's
precedes the final manufacturing or production stage before export to the United States,
unless reasonably available information indicates that such a subsidy is being or has been paid
or bestowed, or such dumping is occurring or has occurred, before such immediately
preceding stage and is having or has had a substantial effect on the price of the merchandise.
This provision would have established a mechanical formula for calculating dumping margins
attributable to input dumping; i.e., comparing foreign market value (FMV) and the (possibly
adjusted) "generally available" price. This formula could often lead to unreasonable results.
For example, suppose the FMV is 10, the "generally available" price (as adjusted, if appropriate and feasible) is 8, and the price at which the input is sold to the producer under investigation
is 5. Under the bill, the margin attributed to input dumping would be 2 (10-8). Yet the actual
dumping margin would ordinarily be calcufated at 5 (10-5), and the competitive benefit to the
input purchaser as 3 (8-5). Alternatively, suppose the "generally available" price (as possibly
adjusted) is 4 (which is not unlikely, since "general availability" refers to the price in the
country where the input is manufactured rather than in the country where it is sold). Under the
bill, the input dumping margin would be 6 (10-4), although traditionally the dumping margin
would be viewed as only 5 (10-5), and the competitive benefit as -1 (4-5). See text accompanying supra note 190.
176. H.R. REP. No. 725, supra note 76, at 25.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Appendix A (at 7-10) to Brock-Baldrige letter, supra note 77.
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letter to the Ways and Means Committee reiterated earlier arguments that
the input dumping provision would violate the GATT, be impossible to
administer in practice, and have a serious potential for unfairness. It added
arguments that the provision is inconsistent with the theory of dumping,
which is based upon a comparison of individual sales prices of the sellers
concerned, rather than country-wide aggregate prices of suppliers to those
producers/sellers. Finally, as with respect to targeting and natural resources,
it also noted the likelihood of enactment of mirror legislation
by foreign
81
countries that would pose a serious threat to U.S. exports.'
The input dumping provision was also widely opposed by business in82
terests, including the American Association of Exporters and Importers, 1
the Business Roundtable,18 3 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 18 4 "a subthe National Foreign Trade Council 185
stantial majority" of members of
186
governments.
foreign
and some
During Ways and Means Committee markups in April, Representative
87
Conable offered an amendment to strike the input dumping provision.
The accompanying explanation for the amendment cited the provision's
inconsistency with GATT, its near impossibility to administer, and its
unfairness (since the input producer "would have no incentive to provide
information in the case").18 8 However, the amendment was not agreed to
and the bill as reported on May 1 included an input dumping provision.
Yet Chairman Gibbons, an original proponent of an input dumping
provision, expressed his willingness to have it stricken during Committee
markup. Presumably he had been convinced by the Administration's strong
view that its enactment would be a clear GATT and Antidumping Code
violation. Gibbons had consistently stated that he supported amendments to
the AD/CVD
laws only if they were consistent with the GATT and GATT
89
codes. 1
181. Id.
182. AAEI Comments, supra note 85, at 5.
183. Business Roundtable Position, supra note 82.
184. U.S. Chamber Position, supra note 81, at 5, reprinted in 3 INT'L Bus. REV. 6 (May
1984).
185. National Foreign Trade Council Statement, supra note 84, at 2.
186. E.g., Gotlieb letter, supra note 142, at 3.
187. Document entitled "Conable Amendment," distributed at House Ways and Means
Committee markup in April 1984.
188. Id.
189. For example, in the Trade Subcommittee's press release announcing proposals to
amend the AD and CVD laws, Chairman Gibbons:
stated that he expects the proposals under consideration to be developed in full conformity
with U.S. obligations under the GATT. In particular, he intends the changes to be consistent
with all of the requirementsset forth in the GA TTAntidumping and Subsidies/Countervailing
Duty Codes. ...
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Press
Release: The Honorable Sam M. Gibbons (D., Fla.), Chairman, Subcommittee on Trade,
WINTER 1985

318

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

The Committee Report noted that the provision as introduced had
erroneously calculated the input dumping margin as the difference between
the foreign market value and the generally available price (as adjusted where
appropriate for price depression by reason of subsidies or dumping) of the
input in the country where the final product is being produced. The
amended version of the input dumping provision calculated the input dumping margin instead as the difference between the purchaseprice of the input
and its generally available price (adjusted, if appropriate, as outlined
above). The Committee thus intended to capture the cost advantage to the

final product as a result of using supplies sold at less
manufacturer of1 9the
0
than fair value.

On July 26, the House considered and passed H.R. 4784 and its input
dumping provision. 19 1

3. H.R. 3398
During the Senate's consideration of H.R. 3398, an input dumping provision nearly identical to the provision in H.R. 4784 was added. 192 When the
House again passed H.R. 3398 with amendments, it added its input dumping
provision from H.R. 4784.193
Despite seeming support by both houses of Congress for an input dumping provision, nonetheless key members of Congress were increasingly
concerned about its clear GATT illegality and apparent unadministrability.
By the time Senate and House conferees met to resolve their differences on
194
despite the
H.R. 3398, they agreed to drop the input dumping provision

absence of any significant difference between the two bills on the point. 195

Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,Announces Action on Proposals to Improve Statutory Remedies Against Injurious Foreign Subsidies and Dumping at 1 (Sept.
27, 1983) (emphasis added).
190. H.R. REP. No. 725, supra note 76, at 35.
191. 130 CONG. REC. H7952-53 (daily ed. July 26, 1984). During debate several members
opposed the input dumping provision. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H7906, H7907 (Rep. Frenzel,
R.-Minn.), H7913 (Rep. Crane, R.-Ill.), H7933 (Rep. Bereuter, R.-Neb.).
192. 130 CONG. REC. Sl1,367-68, S11,372 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984). Cf. earlier input
dumping provisions in § 127 of H.R. 4124, 129 CONG. REC. H8194 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1983); § 127
of S. 2139, 129 CONG. REC. S16,964, S16,968 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983); and § 12 of S.2952, 130
CONG. REC. S10,562 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984).
193. 130 CONG. REC. H11,079-80, H11,085 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984).
194. In fact, the original House "offer" for resolving the difference between the House and
Senate bills on this point was to treat input dumping and upstream subsidies as a package. The
House proposed to drop input dumping and adopt Administration-drafted language on upstream subsidies; the Senate readily agreed. Administration officials were delighted with this
resolution.
195. Because of the substantial similarity in the provisions, Senator Heinz later remarked
that he questioned the appropriateness under applicable rules of the eventual deletion of the
provision from the Trade and Tariff Act.
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V. Other Provisions Deleted from H.R. 3398

In addition to the targeting, natural resource subsidy, and input dumping
provisions, several other lesser provisions were also deleted from H.R. 4784
and/or H.R. 3398. For example, a proposal discussed during the House
Trade Subcommittee's conceptual markup sessions in the fall of 1983 would

have shortened the timetable in all AD cases, as well as shortened the time
during which Commerce could extend "extraordinarily complicated"
cases. 196 H.R. 3398 as passed by the House would have deleted the six-

month grace period for foreign governments or exporters to eliminate or
offset subsidies in connection with suspension of an investigation.' 97 The
Senate bill would have restricted the circumstances under which Commerce
may, under section 736(c) of the Tariff Act, 198 agree to conduct an early
review of antidumping decisions. 199 Also missing from the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984 are a House provision that would have prohibited Commerce

from suspending a CVD investigation based upon the foreign government's
agreement to impose export taxes to offset any subsidies found;200 and
Senate provisions that would have authorized Commerce to suspend AD
investigations based upon quantitative restriction agreements, 20 1 eliminated the U.S. Court of International Trade from judicial review of AD/CVD
determinations, 20 2 established a small business advocate within the Department of Commerce,20 3 and established new dumping calculations for imports from nonmarket economy countries.20 4
VI. Conclusion

As this article has indicated, the Administration largely succeeded in
persuading the Congress to delete from the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984
those trade remedy provisions that it considered most egregious. The target196. See generally Bello and Holmer, Standing, Pre-InitiationConsultations, and Timing of
Decisions Under AD/CVD Law, 18 INT'L LAW. 1001, 1021-28 (1984).
197. H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1984); 130 CONG. REc. H1l,576 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1984).
198. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(c) (1982). See generally Bello and Holmer, Standing, Pre-Initiation
Consultations, and Timing of Decisions under ADICVD Law, 18 INT'L LAW 1001, 1028-31
(1984).
199. H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1984); 130 CONG. REc. Hl1,580 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1984).
200. Id. at 166, 130 CONG. REC. H11,576.
201. Id. at 167, 130 CONG. REC. H11,576.
202. Id. at 179, 130 CONG. REC. H11,579.
203. Id. at 190, 130 CONG. REC. H11,582.
204. See Conference Comparison of H.R. 3398 as passed by the House and the Senate at
150-51 (Oct. 2, 1984). Section 801 of H.R. 3398 as passed by the Senate had included provisions
on "Artificial Pricing Investigations" at the initiative of Senator Heinz. See 130 CONG. REC.
S1 1,372-78 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984). Artificial pricing provisions had originally been discussed
within the House Trade Subcommittee, but were deleted during conceptual markup sessions.
See, e.g., Trade Subcommittee Report, supra note 28, at (IV); supra note 18.
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ing provision was dropped over the summer, more directly in response to
opposition from organized labor than in response to Administration or
business community opposition. 20 5 However, the Administration was able
to convince the House and Senate conferees to drop the input dumping
provision, despite the inclusion of nearly identical language in both Senate
and House passed bills.2 °6 It also managed to obtain deletion of the natural
resource subsidy provision, despite its inclusion in the House bill and strong
support for it by some Senate conferees. 20 7 As Representative Frenzel
remarked:
To be sure, there is still a little bit of mischief
20 8 in it, too, but compared to what
might have been, the mischief is minimal.
In our next article, we will explore the major AD/CVD provisions of 2the
09
Trade and Tariff Act-both the accomplishments and the "mischief.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Supra note 90 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
130 CONG. REC. H11,658 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984).
For a general survey of the accomplishments of the Act, see Price, supra note 1.
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